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1 What Is Still Missing?
Marie Lavigne
Institut de Sciences Mathématiques et Economiques Appliquées (Paris)
and University of Pau
One may liken the situation of any country in transition to the case
of a man who has been severely ill for years.  Nobody really thought
that his condition would improve.  All of a sudden, there is a miracle: a
new medicine is discovered.  The patient’s doctor decides to apply this
new approach—a shock therapy—not quite knowing what is going to
come of it.  Then the miracle goes on: the patient is on his feet again,
following a terrible fever.  Several years pass.  Slowly the patient
regains his former functions.  There are moments of despair.  The pro-
cess is not even.  Sometimes there are bouts of fever.  Sometimes the
patient has the impression that he is worse than before; for months, his
performance declines.  Not that he regrets the treatment; the hope is
there, and he would not want to return to his previous condition.
Sometimes he is angry at the doctor, who sets him impossible targets;
he does not want to undergo all these exercises every day.  However,
little by little, things are steadying.  One day, the patient sees that he
has indeed not only regained his previous level, but has gone beyond
that.
At this point, his doctor tells him that he no longer needs assistance
and that he is a healthy man again.  His friends tell him the same, as
they are tired of being involved in this recovery process.  The patient
himself is not so sure about his condition.  He does not feel all right.
Some days he is limping again.  A small fever persists.  Many
unwanted occurrences bother him:  he is not quite able to coordinate all
his movements, he does or says things that he does not want to do or
say, and he loses his temper too often.  A number of other elements are
missing as well and prevent him from feeling really good.  He cannot
find the right clothes, he does not work quite properly, and sometimes
his memory is failing.  
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Nevertheless, he resolves to go to his former club and to request
readmission.  His old buddies are kind but stern.  So much time has
elapsed since he had to leave the group.  The members are ready to
consider his application, but they impose several demanding condi-
tions.  He is ready to fulfill these requirements even if again it takes
time, because he feels that once he is readmitted, he will be able to say,
“Yes, now I am cured, I am a normal person.”
You must have recognized the actors and the plot of this short
story.  The patient is a transition country, the doctor is the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the friends are international organizations or
other governments providing assistance, and the European Union
(EU), of course, is the club.  Inflation is the recurrent fever.  You may
pinpoint the fall of output or slowdown in growth, the lengthy and
uncompleted process of structural transformation, the unwanted phe-
nomena, and the missing elements in the process.  At least the Eastern
or Central European patient is hopeful about his admission to the club.
However, when will a patient who is not considered for the club be
cured?   That is the question facing Russia and many other countries of
the former Soviet Union area.
So, when is transition over?  The prime minister of the Czech
Republic, Václav Klaus, claimed in December 1995 that transition was
finished as far as his country was concerned, and this claim seemed
reasonable enough.  According to a general view, the transition from
plan to market is largely completed in Central Europe, and to a lesser
extent in Southeast Europe and in the Baltic countries.  It is yet to be
completed in the former Soviet Union space.  Usually the performance
is assessed on the basis of several criteria: 
• a successful stabilization-cum-liberalization policy
• a solid launching of structural transformation
• the building up of conditions for sustainable growth
• progress in integration in the world economy, and, particularly, in
the European economy
I will outline the transition process with a view to identifying what
is still missing: what the patient needs to join the club, and what his
neighbor who will not be joining the club needs to become healthy.  I
will describe transition according to the following features: the lega-
When Is Transition Over? 15
cies of the previous system, the building blocks of the transition pack-
age, the outcomes of macroeconomic reform and structural
transformation, and finally, what still has to be done so as to complete
the transition process.  This discussion leads to four conclusions.  The
legacies of the past are still binding, and the new market economies
bear the traces of this history.  The initial measures did not encompass
the whole process of transition and largely left aside the complex task
of building a market environment.  The outcomes are mixed; several
crises in 1996–1997 showed how fragile transition still is.  Much has
yet to be done to complete the process.
The countries in transition from a planned to a market economy
may be grouped into four broad subsets according to a geopolitical
division:
• Group One consists of the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, including the four Central European countries (Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia) plus Slovenia (the core
“Visegrad” group); Bulgaria and Romania; and the three Baltic
States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).  This group comprises 10
countries that have applied to become members of the EU.
Hence, the completion of the transition process is very much
linked with these countries’ meeting the conditions for becoming
members and with the “pre-accession strategy” conducted in
coordination with the EU.  Albania may be included in this group
in the future.
• Group Two includes the countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), with particular attention to Russia,
which has played, and is bound to play, a decisive role in the CIS
region and in the patterns of transition there.
• Group Three includes the Asian countries in transition, with spe-
cial attention to China and Vietnam.  The other Indochinese coun-
tries, Laos and Cambodia, should also be included in this group,
as well as Mongolia.  This group is very different from the others.
China and Vietnam share three main features: their commitment
to a communist political regime, economic underdevelopment,
and an Asian-type strategy of growth and industrialization in the
framework of transition to the market. 
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• Group Four includes the countries that are for the time being
largely left out of discussion because of the political context, for
example, the countries of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia
excepted).
I shall focus mainly on the two first groups.
THE LEGACIES OF THE PAST
History still heavily constrains the transition process.  Contrary to
an optimistic view that prevailed at the beginning of transition, it was
not enough to overthrow the communist regime in order to clear the
way for a smooth and full-fledged operation of the market.  My stance
is that most of these legacies, if not all, are negative from the point of
view of the transition to a new system.  This stance does not mean that
I regard all of the achievements of the old system as negative.  Obvi-
ously, the system was very wasteful in human and material resources at
the times when it yielded its higher rates of growth.  Later, it failed to
achieve modernization and left all its countries lagging behind West-
ern, developed economies.  It caused great damage to the environment.
However, fundamental needs were satisfied, including high standards
of collective consumption in health and education.  A great degree of
security characterized these societies, with protection against unem-
ployment and provision of basic goods and services on a rather egali-
tarian basis, even taking into account hidden inequalities and a large
amount of politically based corruption.  I present the legacies roughly
according to a scheme devised by János Kornai.  There are three types,
with examples for each: systemic legacies, functional legacies, and
assets and liabilities.
The first systemic legacy is the ideological and political monopoly
of the Communist Party.  Although standard state institutions existed,
there was no state policy outside the party’s decision.  Hence, once the
party’s structure collapsed, the state institutions were not prepared to
fulfill their functions.  One thus had the impression of a “demise of the
state” in the operation of the judiciary, the executive branch (minis-
tries), and the state administration.  The fact that one could find “insti-
tutions” in the planned economies with the same names as in market
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economies (“banks,” “ministries,” “agencies”) gave the false impres-
sion that, once the system had collapsed, these entities could function
as market institutions.
Second, the system was characterized by dominant state (collec-
tive) ownership of the means of production.  The state sector was huge,
meaning that privatization is much more difficult than the same process
in market economies.  Even in those economies that have privatized
faster and more extensively than others, there remains a very large
residual state sector.  In the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have
been formally privatized, the weight of the “insiders” (the former man-
agement, which generally uses the employees to support it) is very big.
As the SOEs were large, their privatization may mean a shift from pub-
lic to private monopolies; thus, de-monopolization is an issue.  The
SOEs were not only production enterprises, but also social security
institutions: they provided for such needs as health care, child care, and
housing, so that the building of an independent Western-type social
safety net is very difficult.
The third systemic legacy is central planning.  As a result, there is
now a distrust of all forms of planning, including strategic planning as
practiced in Western governments and big corporations.  Yet there is a
surviving “planning mentality” in managing stabilization; for example,
the “targets” set by the IMF have often been treated like plan assign-
ments.  The same mentality survives in managing structural transfor-
mation; for example, privatization programs are essentially state
undertakings tightly controlled by the government.1  A lack of under-
standing of market-type coordination, a “legacy” shared by many out-
side advisers as well,2 leads to the idea that, as soon as planning is
abolished, a market economy immediately begins to operate.
Two of the functional legacies are a distorted production structure
and autarky.  The production structure was a consequence of the Soviet
strategy of extensive growth imposed upon Central and Eastern
Europe.  That policy left the countries in transition with an overdevel-
oped heavy industry sector, lacking competitiveness with Western mar-
kets.  In addition, the ratio of exports to gross domestic product (GDP)
was lower than in market economies of similar dimensions, and most
of the trade that did take place was concentrated in Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (Comecon) countries.  Hence, the demise of
Comecon created a substantial shock.
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A less concrete but just as important functional legacy is the inher-
itance of a wide set of specific social values.  The relationship between
the state and the economic agent was marked by what Kornai calls
“paternalism.”  The state enterprise had to carry on political and social
functions, and the individual was protected by the state “from cradle to
grave.”  Many individual legacies follow from paternalism: the belief
of the plant managers that they will be bailed out even if their operating
costs exceed their revenues (this is the definition of the “soft budget
constraint”); the belief of the bank managers that they have to supply
“their” client enterprises with credit whenever the latter ask for it; the
belief of the workers that they have to be paid just for showing up at
the workplace and that they cannot be fired.  Even under the conditions
of transition, these legacies of an implicit “social” contract and of an
implicit “state-enterprise” contract often remain, as in Russia.
Similarly, due to such lingering social values, the image of the
“good” manager as someone who has a positive relationship with the
authorities and is by principle reluctant to lay off workers remains in
the countries that are less advanced in the transition process.  By con-
trast, the efficient manager who tries to reduce costs and increase prof-
its, and who is not adverse to downsizing, has the negative image of a
speculator, if not of a mafioso.   Entrepreneurial skills as such are not
favorably judged.
Human capital and physical infrastructure comprise two legacies
that may be seen as assets or as liabilities.  The stock of human capital
(skilled workforce) is usually viewed as a positive legacy of the sys-
tem.  However, the innovative capacity of  individuals was hampered
by the obsolescence of techniques and by the very weak link between
research and applied development.  Hence, the remaining legacy of
human capital is more a liability than an asset, and the quality of
human capital is rapidly diminishing in the transition process, along
with the decline of health and education indicators, which are embod-
ied in the Human Development Index.   The physical infrastructure is
obsolete and not adapted to the needs of modern market economies, as
it was developed out of strategic and military considerations more than
out of considerations linked to the development of civilian economies.
This infrastructure may be an asset, as in the use of the former military
telecommunications network for civilian needs, but generally it is a lia-
bility, as in the case of roads.
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Why are these legacies detrimental to the course of transition?  The
answer is because they cannot be separated from the system.  For
example, quasi-full employment went with low productivity; skills
gained in school and professional education went with weak incentives
for efficient activity; and low-cost housing led to an overall deteriora-
tion of the civilian housing stock.                                                               
THE TRANSITION PACKAGE
The building blocks for transition have basically been the same for
all of the countries that engaged effectively in reform.  The program
packages have been devised by experts from the countries in transition
(who are often trained in Western economics) and have been supple-
mented with additional features following agreements with the IMF.
The standard package is an adaptation of the “Washington consensus.”3
The package may be divided into three sections:
• initial liberalization of consumer and producer prices, of domes-
tic and foreign trade, and of foreign exchange transactions
• stabilization aimed at resolving macroeconomic imbalances4
• beginning of structural transformation 
There was much discussion initially about the sequencing and the
speed of the reforms.  In fact, these debates lost relevance rather
quickly, as fine-tuning policies appeared illusory in economies charac-
terized by rather primitive market conditions, and as the choice
between the “big bang” (or “shock therapy”) model and the “gradual-
ist” model was largely artificial.   Stabilization and liberalization had to
be conducted fast (otherwise there could be no reform).   Transforma-
tion had to take time, and what mattered was to announce what would
be done and to establish credibility.  When one looks at the nations in
transition overall, including those in the former Soviet Union, the true
dividing line lies between the countries that moved toward reform
(which does not exclude traveling in the reverse direction, as in the
case of Bulgaria for some years), which also comprise all the appli-
cants to EU membership, and the countries that have hardly begun
20 Lavigne
implementing reform (most of the CIS states) or have implemented it
in an erratic way (Russia).
The package of measures to be taken everywhere has encompassed
the following steps.   First, very soon (if possible, on day one), take
early liberalization measures—of prices (with the usual exceptions:
housing, utilities, and energy to be freed up to several years later), of
domestic trade, and of foreign trade and foreign exchange transactions.
Also on day one (in the case of “shock therapy”), begin stabilization
measures aimed at curbing inflation, reducing the budget deficit, and
steadying the exchange rate.  Third, to be announced on day one but to
be completed much later, undertake long-term measures of structural
transformation, including privatization (first, small-scale privatization
and later, large-scale privatization of big firms), banking reform, the
introduction of a capital market, tax and social security reform, and
establishment of environmental and industrial policies.
The means and instruments of achieving these objectives have
depended on the tasks themselves.  For liberalization, it was supposed
that it would be enough for the authorities just to end state involve-
ment.  For stabilization, the standard measures used in market econo-
mies were expected to bring about the desired results.  Nevertheless,
the market had not yet arrived; it was to be effected through structural
reform.
Price liberalization, through the emergence of market-clearing
prices, led very quickly (almost overnight, in the case of Poland) to the
curtailment of shortages.  Several outcomes have become evident.  All
economic agents are now allowed to buy and sell.  Street trade has
expanded, and private shops have opened.  However, the large inherited
wholesale (supplier) organizations in most cases have remained for
some time.  The state retail outlets have sometimes been taken over by
foreign distribution chains.  State foreign trade organizations have been
dismantled, and enterprises may conduct foreign trade transactions on
their own.  Quantitative restrictions on foreign trade have been abol-
ished, and tariffs have been reduced.   Households may sell and buy
foreign currency.  The prices of foreign currency are unified and either
freed (floating-rate regime), or fixed at a very low rate, which may be
the previous black-market rate or be determined along various regimes
(such as managed float, crawling peg, or crawling bands).  In excep-
tional cases, a currency board has been established (in Estonia, Lithua-
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nia, and Bulgaria in 1997).  Convertibility for current account
transactions has become the rule.
The instruments of stabilization have included restrictive monetary
policy and the restoration of positive real interest rates.  This strategy is
considered to be the orthodox approach, where the interest rate is the
main anchor of stabilization policy.   Other times, governments have
established incomes policy with controls on wage increases and weak
indexation of wages on price rises; this is the heterodox approach
(Bruno 1992).  Taxes have been increased, usually with little effect
because of tax evasion and lack of tax reform.  Public expenditures
have been cut even beyond the reduction of price subsidies.  While the
domestic currency has been sharply devalued from the outset, stabiliza-
tion policy should avoid further devaluation (an extreme solution is to
adopt a currency board regime) as well as an appreciation of the real
exchange rate.
There are many early measures of structural reform, implemented
in different order and at diverse speeds by the various countries.  Priva-
tization, a major task of transition, has often been undertaken in two
stages:  the immediate beginning of “small privatization” (selling small
public property), and preparing and launching large-scale privatization,
which takes several years.  One country (the Czech Republic) pro-
ceeded quickly to mass privatization on the basis of “voucher” distribu-
tion of state-owned assets, and in most countries (except Hungary),
mass privatization has been a component of the large privatization
strategy.
Financial markets are another major focus of structural transforma-
tion.  Reform of the banking sector requires the introduction of a two-
tier banking system (if it did not exist already), turning the state com-
mercial banks into private banks or incorporating them, changing
banking operations, beginning the financial restructuring of banks
(through consolidating bad loans or other methods), and implementing
bankruptcy laws.   Countries have also set up stock exchanges and
developed domestic securities (often in relation to privatization).
Finally, there are several measures involved in the structural refor-
mation of the state.  Governments have begun to create modern tax
regimes, generalize income taxes, set up a value-added tax, and
improve tax collection.  They must also replace what was an all-
embracing social security system basically managed by the SOEs with
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a modern system combining state allowances and private insurance
schemes.  The reform here is very difficult because of lack of means
and of institutions and because strong political and social opposition
usually exists (Lavigne 1995).
THE OUTCOMES
The outcomes of transition thus far should be assessed by looking
at real and at monetary-financial economic indicators, which are pre-
sented in Tables 1, 2, and 3.  There are many similarities among the
countries.  There has been a global deterioration in the “human devel-
opment” situation, as measured by the set of criteria used by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) (Table 1, p. 30).  The Human
Development Index improved only in Poland.  There was a large drop
in output for all the transition countries in the 1990s (Table 2), fol-
lowed by recoveries of varying strengths in Central and Eastern
Europe, but not yet in the former Soviet Union.  There was a still
deeper drop in investment in most cases, with a protracted recovery.
Unemployment rates in Central and Eastern Europe have stabilized at
relatively high levels (with the exception of the Czech Republic) as
compared with Western European rates.  Real incomes fell, followed
by a modest increase, especially when incomes are measured in dol-
lars, which points to an appreciation of the real interest rate.
Most countries had similar outbursts of inflation, followed by a sta-
bilization of the inflation rate at moderate to high levels.  Even in the
most successful countries, the inflation rate is still well above the West-
ern European average.  Many have had great difficulties in maintaining
budgetary deficits at “acceptable” levels (as defined in IMF packages),
although some have succeeded, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
and Slovenia.  Exchange rate stabilization has been successful, with
exceptions.  However, there has been sharp deterioration of foreign
trade and current account balances and emerging problems with short-
term capital inflows (Table 3).
Structural transformation in terms of the management and gover-
nance of enterprises has lagged, even though privatization is supposed
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to have been largely achieved.  Banking and financial reforms and the
modernization of social security systems have also been slow.
The bottom line is that recovery, even when underway, is impaired
by factors on the supply side, such as the impact of the initial cuts in
investment, and by both domestic and foreign factors on the demand
side.  Also, macroeconomic stabilization is still fragile.  The question
to be asked is whether the strategies themselves explain these results,
or if they are due to the quality of the implementation, or to the initial
situation of each country.  A debated topic is the link between liberal-
ization, on the one hand, and growth and inflation, on the other hand.
The World Bank World Development Report 1996, devoted to the
countries in transition, raised the issue, which has been elaborated
upon in de Melo and Gelb (1996) and in Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh
(1997).  The conclusion is that growth and the control of inflation go
together and that both are positively related to liberalization.  This
analysis leaves aside the slow progress in structural reform, which
itself may affect growth and stabilization.  The slackening of growth in
1996 and the wave of crises in 1996–1997 that hit not only “lagging
reformers” such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, but also the Czech
Republic, exemplify this impact.
THE NEW MARKET ECONOMIES 
IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES
What remains to be done to complete the transition process?  For
the countries that have applied for membership in the EU, the most
immediate objective is to meet the conditions imposed by the EU.
Does this mean that once the conditions are met (and the countries are
accepted in the EU, with a new “transition” period ahead), the systemic
transition is over?  First, the EU conditions do not address the question
of a sustainable growth strategy.  Second, the accession here deals with
countries that have not yet created a market economy in the Western
sense.  In the case of the countries belonging to the former Soviet
Union, the prospects are still more remote.  Table 4 offers an assess-
ment of the structural achievements of a sample of countries.  Before
considering the EU conditions further, I will list several frequently
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mentioned obstacles still faced in the building of standard market econ-
omies.
An obstacle on which many observers focus, especially in the case
of Russia, is the development of organized crime and corruption on an
unusually high level.  The combination of the experience of the clan-
destine mafias of the past and the high technology and financial means
available to the modern Western criminal groups, which have quickly
established links with the ex-Soviet and Eastern European mafias, can
be extremely detrimental.  Related to the development of economic
crime, an egalitarian society has been replaced by an unequal society
(see the evolution of the Gini coefficients in Table 1) with an uneven
distribution of income and wealth.  Such a pattern is not uncommon in
developing nations, but the countries in transition offer a wide variety
of “niches” to exploit in the black and gray economic sectors, allowing
quick and large gains (for example, the “give-away” forms of privatiza-
tion, the opportunities of the emergent capital markets, and the use of
domestic or foreign trade networks).  These niches mean that large and
influential circles of economic actors are opposed to the establishment
of a transparent market economy.
Efficient market institutions are still lacking, such as working
bankruptcy procedures, clear corporate governance rules, prudential
rules for the banking system, regulation of the capital markets, effec-
tive tax collection, and a flexible labor market.  Also needed is efficient
state administration, which would be able to implement laws without
discrimination and without excessive red tape in order to ensure ade-
quate protection for investors (foreign and domestic) and for partners
in business contracts, consumers, and other economic agents.  A new,
positive vision of the character of the state (neither totalitarian nor
paternalistic) is required, instead of an excessive confidence in the mar-
ket mechanism.  The World Development Report 1997, devoted to the
role of the state in a market economy, discusses what should be done in
transition countries, as well as in other developing countries (World
Bank 1997b, pp. 164–165).
Next in this list of obstacles is the lack of appropriate social poli-
cies.  In the countries in transition, one has witnessed a deterioration in
the situation of pensioners, who are often below the poverty line, and,
at the same time, a growing strain on the budget due to the increasing
number of pensioners.  This is especially true as the new regimes have
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usually kept the rather generous age conditions for being eligible for a
pension.  Less and less are health and education services provided free
of charge, especially at high-quality levels (e.g., specialized medical
care, university and professional education), while standard services
are quickly deteriorating.
More generally speaking, these countries—even those that seem
the most mature and ready to integrate in the European economy as
members of the EU—do not yet display sound relations between the
state and civil society.  Despite privatization and the reduction in gov-
ernment social expenditures, people still count on the state for their
well-being or at least for the alleviation of their hardships, and rightly
so: in some instances, the authorities still behave as did the old “pater-
nalistic” state, especially when this behavior does not entail direct bud-
getary expenditures.  A good case is the low level of unemployment in
the Czech Republic.  Did the government willingly sustain employ-
ment?  It could not be so, especially when, at the same time, the
authorities complained about low productivity in the state-owned sec-
tor.  However, bankruptcy proceedings were not initiated against insol-
vent enterprises, and declining industries were still supported by the
state, often on the grounds that they provided exports.  In addition,
managers in the state-owned sector often considered their first task to
be the preservation of employment. 
In turn, the survival of past attitudes toward the state has many
consequences.  One is the vulnerability of the people to populist
pledges from leaders or would-be leaders.  Candidates in elections are
readily believed when they promise their constituencies “catching up”
in terms of welfare or in the improvement of their living standards.
What makes it easy is the existence of ready-made scapegoats such as
the IMF or the EU.  Another consequence of old attitudes is the weak-
ness of societal organizations, because people are used to turning to the
state, which previously was tantamount to the party.  There were no
responsible trade unions able to negotiate with employers and repre-
sentatives of the government, and no consumer and other associations
and foundations.  Where these institutions have appeared, they are only
beginning to get adjusted to their new functions.
We may thus conclude that, for some time, these new market econ-
omies will be mixed economies in two senses.  First, they will remain
strongly influenced by state policies, both as a residual of the past
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(even if it is not acknowledged by their governments) and as a neces-
sity in the context of institution-building and growth-promoting action.
Second, they will lag behind the advanced market economies in devel-
opment levels and in fullness of markets, and even behind the most
successful emergent economies of Asia or Latin America in the context
of a global economy.
The outside world can and does contribute (in terms of assistance,
foreign investment, and access to markets).  However, this help, be it
multilateral or bilateral, public or private, is always dictated by the
general interests of the donors, investors, or partners.  Multilateral
assistance is never so considerable as when the issue invokes a global
crisis (Mexico in 1994, Thailand in 1997).  The initial aim of foreign
investment is not the promoting of structural transformation and mana-
gerial skills: investors want profits and markets first.  This means that
the recipient countries must themselves absorb assistance and invest-
ments efficiently, and such an absorption is not automatically gener-
ated by the market.
Do the EU conditions for membership imposed on the Central and
Eastern European countries constitute useful criteria that enable us to
say, once they are met, that transition is over?  It is likely that they do
not.  In fact, the implementation of these conditions may be hindered
by problems with definitions, and, in many cases, these stipulations are
stricter than those placed on current member countries.
One condition of the EU pre-accession strategy (first defined in the
“Copenhagen Principles” stated in 1993) is that the country must be a
stable, pluralist democracy committed to the rule of law, respect for
human rights, and protection of minorities.  Many transition countries
do still have problems in these areas, including discrimination against
minorities, lack of freedom of the press, and corruption in judiciary
systems.  These requirements, however, were not imposed on previous
candidates to the EU.  Clearly, issues such as freedom of the press are
more obvious in the formerly communist countries, but the Western
European countries are certainly not immune to problems of corruption
and discrimination.
A second condition of the strategy is that the candidate be an estab-
lished market economy.  What is “an established market economy”?
No explanation is given, and the implication seems to be that you know
a market economy when you see one.  Many will consider the Central
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and Eastern European countries to be established market economies
only when they become EU members: the condition is the outcome.
A third condition is that the economy be able to cope with compet-
itive forces and market pressures within the EU.  Again, no explanation
is provided.  The stipulation implies that the economy be truly liberal-
ized and not protectionist, that it abstain from subsidizing firms or sec-
tors, and that current account deficits be covered by inflows of long-
term capital foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than by growing
short-term indebtedness.  A fourth condition is that the applicant be
able to assume the obligations of membership, in particular as far as
the acquis communautaire is concerned.5  These obligations include an
enormous number of detailed requirements, which continue to evolve
over time.  The extent of compliance with all of them is largely a mat-
ter of political assessment.
An implicit condition of accession is that stabilization must be
complete.  Stabilization, as we saw above, entails controlling inflation,
the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP, and the level of public debt, as
well as controlling the current account deficit without resorting to
devaluation.  However, these conditions are essentially the Maastricht
convergence criteria, which were not to be imposed on the applicant
countries.
When is transition over?  As alluded to by the parable at the begin-
ning of my paper, that determination is clearly shaped by the biases of
those who are judging.  In sum, I think the question is unanswerable.
NOTES
1. These programs are tightly controlled by the state without any countervailing
power from large private corporations, with which Western governments have to
cope when they try to control privatization.
2. In the beginning of transition, many advisors entertained the illusion that it was
enough to lift the controls and “let the cards fall” to get a fully fledged market.
For instance, see Sachs (1993, p. xii): “Markets spring up as soon as central plan-
ning bureaucrats vacate the field.”
3. See Williamson (1994).  The Washington consensus sums up the standard pack-
age recommended by the World Bank and the IMF to the developing countries
with balance of payments problems in the 1980s.
4. These two building blocks have sometimes been lumped together in a “stabiliza-
tion-cum-liberalization” concept.
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5. In EU parlance, acquis communautaire encompasses all the decisions and legal
provisions of any kind implemented since the relevant treaties among the mem-
bers have been ratified, as well as the national laws based on these decisions and
provisions.
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30Table 1 Basic Demographic and Social Data on the Countries in Transition
Gini coeff.
Life expectancy Infant mortality 1994 Change
1995 1985–1995 at birth rate per 1,000 Share of since
Population Pop. growth (years) live births pop. age 1993 1987–1988 HDIb
Country (millions) (%/year) 1990 1995 1991 1995 15–64 (%) (%) (% pts.) 1990 1995
Group One
Czech Rep. 10.33 0.0 71.3c 73 10 8 65 27 8 0.892 0.884
Hungary 10.23 –0.3 69 70 16 11 62 23 2 0.887 0.857
Poland 38.61 0.4 71.1 70 15 14 55 30 5 0.831 0.851
Slovakia 5.37 0.3 70.9c 72 12 11 60 20c 0.892 0.875
Slovenia 1.99 0.1 n.a.d 74 10 7 56 28 4 n.a. 0.887
Bulgaria 8.40 –0.6 73 71 17 15 66 34 11 0.854 0.789
Romania 22.69 0.0 71 70 27 n.a. 65 26c 0.709 0.696
Estonia 1.49 –0.3 69.3 70 14 14 39 39 16 0.872 0.758
Latvia 2.52 –0.4 69.1 69 16 16 60 27 0.868 0.704
Lithuania 3.72 0.5 70.4 69 14 14 55 34 0.881 0.750
Albania 3.26 1.0 72 73 28 30 60 n.a. 0.699 0.656
Group Two
Russia 148.20 0.3 67.9c 65 20 18 65 48 14–24e 0.862 0.769
Belarus 10.34 0.4 69.8c 70 15 13 60 22 0.861 0.783
Ukraine 51.55 0.1 69.4c 69 18 15 60 26c 0.844 0.665
Moldova 4.34 0.4 67.6c 69 23 22 60 34c 0.758 0.610
31
Kazakhstan 16.61 0.5 69.6c 69 32 27 59 33c 0.802 0.695
Kyrgyzstan 4.52 1.2 69c 68 40 30 55 50 9–33e 0.689 0.633
Turkmenistan 19.17 3.3 65c 67 56 46 55 36 0.726 0.660
Uzbekistan 22.77 2.3 69.2c 70 44 30 55 n.a. 0.695 0.659
SOURCE: World Bank 1991 and 1997a; World Bank 1996; UNDP, 1993 and 1996.
a The Gini index measures the extent to which the actual distribution of income deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.  A Gini index
of 0 percent represents a perfect equality, whereas an index of 100 percent represents maximum inequality.
b The HDI (Human Development Index) as computed by the United Nations Development Program.
c 1992 data.
d n.a. = data not available.
e A range of values for the change is due to statistical inconsistencies.
32Table 2 Basic Macroeconomic Data on the Countries in Transition
1995 1995 1996 1995
1995 GDP per Unemploy- 1995 Average General 
GDP per capita GDP ment rate Investment 1995 Inflation rated monthly government 
capitaa PPPb growth indexc (% of labor rate Investment Highest wages balance/
Country (U.S.$) (U.S.$) 1993e 1996 force) (% of GDP) indexc (1991–1996) 1996 (U.S.$) GDP
Group One
Czech Rep. 3,870 9,770 65.4 69.8 2.9 31.0 65 57
(1991)
9 356 0.4
Hungary 4,120 6,410 81.9 86.0 10.4 19.3 62 35
(1991)
24 307 –6.5
Poland 2,790 5,400 82.2
(1991)
104.5 14.9 17.1 55 586
(1990)
20 350 –3.5
Slovakia 2,950 6,660 75.0
(1992)
89.8 13.1 29.2 60 61
(1991)
6 266 3.2
Slovenia 8,200 9,350 79.9
(1992)
88.2 14.5 21.2 56 549
(1990)
10 953 –0.0f
Bulgaria 1,330 4,480 73.3 68.5 11.1 14.2 66 338
(1991)
123 77 –5.7
Romania 1,480 4,360 75.0
(1992)
88.2 9.5 21.9 65 256
(1993)
39 138 –2.8
Estonia 2,860 4,220 63.2
(1992)
67.0 15.0 25.0 39 1,078
(1992)
23 n.a. –0.8
Latvia 2,270 3,370 51.0 51.7 6.6 16.6 60 951
(1992)
18 n.a. –3.3








Russia 2,240 4,480 71.9 56.6 8.2 19.8 65 1,529
(1992)
48 156 –4.9
Belarus 2,070 4,220 78.2 63.4 2.7 25.1 60 2,220
(1994)
53 n.a. –1.9
Ukraine 1,630 2,400 68.0 41.6 0.9 20.0 60 4,735
(1993)
24 75 –5.0
Moldova 920 n.a. 57.0 35.0 1.4 7.4 60 1,751
(1993)
24 n.a. –5.5
Kazakhstan 1,330 3,010 49.0
(1995)
49.2 2.1 18.8 59 1,880
(1994)
39 n.a. –2.3
Kyrgyzstan 700 1,800 53.2
(1995)
56.3 3.0 22.0 55 1,209
(1993)
30 n.a. –12.5
Turkmenistan 920 n.a. 82.7 59.6 n.a. n.a. 55 2,714
(1993)
500 n.a. –1.6
Uzbekistan 970 2,370 80.5
(1995)
82.1 0.3 n.a. 55 550
(1994)
50 n.a. –4.1
SOURCE: World Bank 1996; Podkaminer et al. 1998 (for monthly wages in $).
a Based on the 1995 exchange rate.
b PPP = purchasing power parity.
c 1989 = 100.
d Annual % change in CPI from preceding year.
e Or lowest point of the GDP index.
f Actual value –0.03.
g n.a. = data not available.
34Table 3 Foreign Trade and Financial Data on the Countries in Transition
Country

















Czech Rep. 54.0 42.6 –11.5 7,371 2.7 712 36
Hungary 36.4 29.6 –6.9 13,377 4.5 1,307 62
Poland 28.2 18.6 –9.2 5.492 2.1 142 31
Slovakia 57.7 46.6 –11.1 789 0.3 147 33
Slovenia 50.8 44.9 –5.9 786 1.0 393 22
Bulgaria 43.3 45.3 2.0 399 0.9 48 103
Romania 28.1 21.6 –6.5 1,184 0.6 52 23
Estonia 75.3 48.9 –26.4 752 1.4 507 7
Latvia 45.4 28.3 –17.2 775 4.2 310 8
Lithuania 59.6 44.4 –15.2 261 1.5 70 16
Albania 34.8 8.1 –26.7 258 2.2 72 23
Group Two
Russia 7.1 15.6 8.5 7,519 0.4 50 29
Belarus 17.6 13.6 –4.0 57 0.1 6 10
Ukraine 18.6 15.6 –3.0 1,245 0.9 24 20
Moldova 26.0 15.9 –10.1 167 5.7 38 41
Kazakhstan 6.2 13.9 7.7 2,591 5.0 150 n.a.
35
Kyrgyzstan 22.5 5.8 –16.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Turkmenistan 30.6 17.7 –12.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Uzbekistan 22.3 20.3 –2.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SOURCE: EBRD 1996; ECE/UN 1997; World Bank 1991, 1996, and 1997a; Podkaminer et al. 1997.




























Czech Rep. 75 4 3 3 5 3 3 3 24
Hungary 70 4 3 3 5 3 3 3 24
Poland 60 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 23
Estonia 70 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 22
Slovenia 45 3 3 3 5 2 3 3 22
Slovakia 70 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 23
Romania 60 3 2 3 3 1 3 2 17
Bulgaria 45 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 16
Latvia 60 3 3 3 4 2 3 2 20
Lithuania 65 3 3 3 4 2 3 2 20
Albania 75 2 2 3 4 2 2 2 17
Group Two
Russia 60 3 2 3 4 2 2 3 19
Belarus 15 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 13
Ukraine 40 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 16
Moldova 40 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 18
Kazakhstan 40 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 18
37
Kyrgyzstan 50 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 18
Turkmenistan 20 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 8
Uzbekistan 40 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 16
SOURCE: Adapted from EBRD 1996; data as of August 1996.
a Countries in Group 1 are listed in general order of consideration for EU admission.
b Priv./GDP = officially declared share of the private sector in the creation of GDP.
c L-S priv. = large-scale privatization.
5: Standards typical of advanced industrial economies, though the state of corporate governance may be unclear; more than 75% of
state assets privatized
4: More than 50% of state assets privatized; apparently substantial insider ownership
3: More than 25% of state assets privatized; apparently substantial insider ownership
2: Beginning of implementation of comprehensive privatization schemes
1: Little private ownership
d Enterpr. rest. = enterprise restructuring.
3: Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to enforce bankruptcy legislation
2: Moderately tight credit, weak enforcement of bankruptcy legislation; de-monopolization is slow
1: Soft budget constraint (lax tax and credit policies); few efforts to promote corporate governance
e Price lib. = price liberalization.
3: Substantial progress on price liberalization; energy prices, utilities not completely freed
2: Substantial remaining price controls and state procurement
f Forex lib. = foreign exchange liberalization.
5: Completed, with only some restrictions for capital movements
4: Quasi-convertibility of the domestic currency for current account transactions
3: Remaining exchange controls and multiple exchange rates
2: Some liberalization of import and export controls; almost full current account convertibility, but the forex regime is not transparent
and may have multiple rates
1: Widespread export/import and foreign exchange controls
38g Comp. pol. = competition policy.
3: Some efforts to promote a competitive environment; reduction of entry restrictions; difficulties in breaking up of large monopolies
2: Competition policies and institutions beginning to be set up
1: No competitive legislation or policy
h Bank. reform = banking reform.
3: Fully established two-tier system; framework for prudential regulation; significant presence of private or foreign banks, though
the banking sector remains state-owned in its majority; beginning of a lending policy, though banks remain risk-adverse and
lack experience in assessing the solvency of the enterprises, thus restraining credit and contributing to inter-enterprise arrears.
2: Liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or interest rate ceilings
1: Two-tier system; no further reform
i Capital markets.
3: Creation of investment vehicles (investment funds, insurance, or pension funds); opening of stock exchanges; issuance of securities
by private enterprises and by the government
2: Legislation for the setting up of stock exchanges; some trading in government bonds
1: Little progress in reforms
j Overall rating.
The overall rating is a “mechanical” addition of ratings obtained in Columns 2 though 8.  It is obvious that the provisional choice of
the European Commission in selecting the first group of countries to begin negotiations for EU accession (confirmed by the December
1997 Summit of the EU) rests upon logical assumptions.  Estonia is doing best among the Baltic states and Slovenia among the South-
east European ones (in addition, Slovenia has the highest GDP per capita of all the countries in transition [see Table 2], which would
suggest less need for support).  As to the “exclusion” of Slovakia, it has been motivated mainly by political reasons (the lack of respect
for the rights of minorities, and what is felt in the West as the lasting influence of former Party and police cadres).
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